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This conference has reminded me of a quandary 
confronting my family.  We live in a home with a surfeit of 
advantages, including a small forested area in the backyard 
that brings an oasis of calm to our very busy lives.  And yet the 
vintage sixties-era master bathroom is in dire need of 
remodeling, the “recreation room” in the basement is an 
eyesore, and, most disconcerting of all for a writer with four 
children and a husband often in the house, the house lacks a 
study. 
Now my family has several options from which it can 
choose.  None is wholly palatable.  We can, at considerable 
expense and some inconvenience, add a study to the house and 
remodel its dilapidated rooms.  Or we can move to another 
house or build a new one, incurring the physical, emotional, 
and financial tolls that accompany the uprooting of a family 
from one place to another.  Or we can do nothing. 
This conference, commendably, has highlighted an array of 
options for opening up the netherworld of prisons, jails, and 
other correctional facilities.  Our primary focus has been on 
innovative oversight mechanisms currently in place, both 
within and outside the United States.  The description of these 
oversight tools has planted seeds that are percolating in all of 
us, prompting us to ask how these cutting-edge programs and 
approaches can be further refined and then transplanted in 
jurisdictions across the country. 
But while we embrace the allure of promising new ideas 
for correctional oversight, we must be mindful not to overlook 
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the reality that there already is an oversight mechanism, 
national in scope, in place in this country—correctional 
accreditation.  And however imperfect that process may be—
and it is flawed—we would be remiss if we were to ignore the 
questions of whether and how the correctional accreditation 
process can be modified, improved, and perhaps revamped to 
better achieve at least three goals: one, making correctional 
operations and conditions more transparent to governmental 
officials and the public; two, holding governmental officials 
accountable for decisions they make bearing on correctional 
operations and conditions; and three, ensuring that 
correctional operations and conditions comport with sound 
correctional practices, legal requirements, and basic human-
rights precepts.  To ignore these questions would be, at least in 
some ways, the equivalent of my family reflexively moving from 
our “flawed” house without first considering whether it would 
be more cost-effective and preferable in the long run to correct 
these flaws instead of supplanting them with the inevitable 
imperfections and disadvantages of a new house. 
In other ways though, the housing analogy is inapposite.  
While my family must live in one house or another, individuals 
developing a template for the oversight of prisons, jails, and 
other correctional institutions need not, and indeed should not, 
confine themselves to the selection of only one correctional 
oversight mechanism to achieve the three goals described 
earlier.  Each correctional oversight mechanism, including 
those discussed at this conference, has its own unique 
advantages and disadvantages.  By adopting an optimal 
number and blend of oversight mechanisms, a jurisdiction can 
capitalize on the strengths of the mechanisms selected and 
utilize one or more mechanisms to compensate for the 
deficiencies in another. 
The point then is not that we should first determine the 
extent to which the correctional accreditation process can be 
refined because those refinements can stave off the need for the 
adoption of other oversight mechanisms.  They cannot.  The 
point rather is a bit more nuanced: that the correctional 
accreditation process, for at least two reasons, should be the 
starting point for an assessment of the efficacy of prison-
oversight systems in this country and the development of 
recommendations to augment and improve those systems.  
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First, that process is already in place, and many of the 
jurisdictions in this country with the largest prison 
populations, including the Federal Government and the State 
of Texas, participate in it.  If efforts to refine prison-oversight 
processes are to have their maximal effect and to have that 
effect as soon as possible, the examination and upgrading of 
the correctional accreditation process, followed by its 
expansion, must be a top priority. 
Second, decisions as to what additional oversight 
mechanisms are needed in a particular jurisdiction and how 
they should be structured may hinge in part on how the 
accreditation process operates and the kinds of modifications, if 
any, made to it.  Certain oversight mechanisms may not be 
needed, certain others may need to be adopted, and still others 
may need to be reshaped depending on the changes made or 
not made in the accreditation process.  If, for example, the 
correctional accreditation process were to be changed to require 
regular and unannounced visits to correctional institutions, 
similar unannounced visits by certain other oversight bodies 
might not be necessary or, if necessary, might be scheduled at 
times and frequencies that do not duplicate, but complement, 
the work of the accrediting body.  Alternatively, prudence 
might dictate that, at least sometimes, the unannounced visits 
of another oversight entity occur at times close to the 
accreditation audit to ensure that the visits of the accreditation 
auditors yield thorough and accurate findings regarding the 
conditions and operations of a correctional facility. 
This article focuses on correctional accreditation, 
specifically the accreditation of correctional institutions by the 
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections.  The Commission 
is the only entity that accredits entire correctional facilities 
nationwide, although several other accrediting bodies accredit 
correctional healthcare programs.  The Commission works 
under the auspices of the American Correctional Association 
(ACA), an organization comprised largely, but not exclusively, 
of correctional professionals.  The accreditation process is 
commonly referred to as the “ACA accreditation process.”
Part I of the article begins with a general overview of the 
ACA accreditation process, including a profile of some of its 
strengths and one systemic weakness.  Part II then describes 
several key structural features of a different kind of 
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accreditation system—the system for accrediting colleges, 
universities, and other higher-education institutions.  Part III 
concludes with a proposal for a paradigmatic shift in 
correctional accreditation, one that, I believe, will enable the 
correctional accreditation process to better achieve the goals of 
securing transparency, accountability, and compliance with 
legal and professional requirements in the operation of this 
nation’s prisons, jails, and other correctional facilities. 
I.  The ACA Accreditation Process 
A. General Overview 
The Commission on Accreditation for Corrections accredits 
a wide range of correctional facilities and programs, including 
prisons, jails, boot camps, juvenile detention facilities, juvenile 
training schools, juvenile and adult community residential 
facilities, and probation and parole programs.  While I will 
describe the process followed when accrediting prisons, the 
Commission adheres to the same general procedures when 
determining whether to accredit or reaccredit other kinds of 
correctional institutions or programs. 
The two most important stages of the formal accreditation 
process are the standards-compliance audit and the 
accreditation hearing.  During the audit, a team of auditors 
with correctional expertise inspects the prison, formally or 
informally interviews some inmates, line staff, and 
administrators, and reviews the documentation that the prison 
personnel must compile to demonstrate compliance with the 
accreditation standards.  The audit team typically is comprised 
of three to four members.  When an accreditation audit 
includes an inspection and accreditation of healthcare services, 
the audit team also includes a healthcare professional.
An accreditation audit normally is completed within two to 
three days.  The audit team then submits a written report to 
the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections recounting its 
findings.  That report specifies what standards the audit team 
considers inapplicable to the applicant prison.  For example, 
the standard governing the housing, services, and programs 
provided in prisons with both male and female inmates would 
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be deemed inapplicable to a prison housing male inmates only.1
The audit report also identifies the applicable standards 
with which the prison is not in compliance.  Another section of 
the report evaluates the “quality of life” at the prison.  This 
part of the report summarizes strong suits of the prison such as 
its cleanliness at the time of the audit, highlights conditions 
that imperil the health or safety of prisoners and staff, and 
denotes palpable deficiencies in the programs and services 
afforded prisoners at the prison. 
In order to be accredited, a prison must meet 100% of the 
mandatory accreditation standards and 90% of the 
nonmandatory standards.2  In practice, only rarely does the 
Commission accredit a correctional facility or program with a 
compliance score of less than 95%.  Even if a prison attains the 
required numerical score for accreditation, the Commission 
still can deny accreditation if it finds that conditions at the 
prison are adversely affecting the life, health, or safety of staff 
or inmates.3
The Commission on Accreditation for Corrections currently 
is comprised of twenty-eight individuals.4  Most of its members 
are correctional administrators who work in a correctional 
facility or program, or a central office that oversees operations 
at a number of correctional facilities or programs.  In addition, 
the American Bar Association, the American Institute of 
Architects, the National Association of Counties, and the 
National Sheriffs’ Association appoint representatives to serve 
on the Commission, and one of the elected citizens-at-large on 
the Commission must come from outside the field of 
corrections.5
At the accreditation hearing, representatives from a prison 
that has applied for accreditation or reaccreditation appear 
before a Commission panel comprised of three to five members.  
1. See AM. CORR. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS, Standard 4-4278, at 76 (4th ed. 2003). 
2. Mandatory standards are defined as those which “directly affect the 
life, health, and safety of offenders and correctional employees.” Id. at 192. 
3. COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORR., COMMISSIONERS’ MANUAL 28-29 
(2008). 
4. American Correctional Association: Standards and Accreditation, 
http://www.aca.org/standards/faq.asp#commission_who (last visited Aug. 27, 
2010). 
5. Id.
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One of the primary responsibilities of the panel during the 
hearing is to render decisions on the audit team’s preliminary 
findings that the prison is in noncompliance with certain 
standards.  A prison has four options when an audit team 
reports that it is in violation of an accreditation standard.  The 
prison can appeal the finding of noncompliance, and if the 
Commission grants the appeal, the prison’s compliance score 
will be adjusted upwards. 
The prison’s second option is to submit a “plan of action”
outlining how and by when the prison will come into 
compliance with the standard.  The Commission assesses the 
plan of action for its feasibility and adequacy and may require 
that the prison modify the plan of action, changing the steps 
that the prison will take to come into compliance with the 
standard or the timetable for achieving compliance. 
The prison’s third option is to request a waiver of the 
requirement that it meet the terms of the standard.  According 
to the Commission’s policies, it is supposed to grant a waiver 
request only when the prison demonstrates that it is “unable” 
to comply with the standard for one of four specified reasons: 
(1) a statute “specifically prohibits” compliance; (2) bringing the 
physical plant of the prison into compliance with a standard 
would require “substantial expenditures”; (3) the violation of 
the standard is de minimis in nature; or (4) the prison has 
striven repeatedly and unsuccessfully to obtain the funds that 
would enable it to come into compliance with the standard and 
can document those efforts.6
Even if a prison establishes that it meets one of the four 
prerequisites for a waiver set forth above, the prison must 
surmount two other hurdles before the Commission is 
authorized to grant a waiver request.  First, the prison must 
document that its noncompliance is de minimis and, if not, that 
the prison has taken adequate steps to mitigate the adverse 
effects stemming from its noncompliance with an accreditation 
standard.7  An example of such mitigation would be limiting 
the amount of time that prisoners are required to be in cells 
that do not meet the ACA standards’ cell-size requirements.  
6. COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORR., supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis 
in the original). 
7. Id. at 26. 
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Second, the prison must prove that the noncompliance is not 
jeopardizing the lives, health, or safety of prisoners or staff, or 
compromising the meeting of constitutional requirements.8
In 2005, the Commission created a fourth option for 
prisons (and other correctional facilities and programs) not 
meeting an accreditation standard.9  Under certain 
circumstances, the prison simply can opt out of the 
requirement that it comply with a particular standard.  This 
option, which is formally known as “discretionary compliance,” 
is different from a waiver.  While waiver requests purportedly 
are grounded, at least generally, on a prison’s inability to meet 
a standard,10 a prison can choose, in many instances, to 
designate a nonmandatory standard as “discretionary” when 
the prison “does not wish to comply with” the standard.11
A prison can denominate a particular nonmandatory 
standard as “discretionary compliance” if two requirements are 
met.  First, the prison’s reason for not wanting to meet the 
standard must correspond with one of the five reasons set forth 
in the Commission’s policies:
1. An unwillingness to request funds from a 
parent agency or funding source; or, 
2. A preference to satisfy the standard/expected 
practice’s intent in an alternative fashion; or 
3. An objection from a parent agency, higher 
level government official, or funding source to 
the nature of the standard/expected practice; 
or 
4. A clear policy in place at a higher level that is 
8. Id.
9. See Melissa J. Mall, Commission on Accreditation for Corrections 
Adopts a New Policy, 67 CORRECTIONS TODAY 105 (July 2005).  It bears 
mentioning that while I was not on the Commission in 2005, I had opposed 
for many years the adoption of this noncompliance option. 
10. Several of the delineated reasons for granting a waiver seem to 
conflict with the statement in the Commission’s policy manual that the 
inability to comply with a standard is a precondition for a waiver.  For 
example, although a prison might be able to come into compliance with a 
physical-plant standard, it might be eligible for a waiver because of the 
significant renovation or construction costs that would need to be incurred in 
achieving compliance. 
11. COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORR., supra note 3, at 27. 
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contrary to the requirements of the 
standard/expected practice; or, 
5. An existing provision in a collective 
bargaining agreement that makes compliance 
impossible (without bargaining with the 
employees’ union to effect such a change).12
Second, the prison must describe how noncompliance with 
the standard will not have a “significant” detrimental effect on 
the life, health, and safety of staff or inmates, or on the 
operation of the prison in conformance with constitutional 
requirements “to any degree.”13
If the Commission panel concludes that the above two 
requirements are met, the prison is exempted from the 
requirement that it meet the standard.  But the Commission 
places a cap on the percentage of nonmandatory standards that 
a prison, at its discretion, can opt out of.  If the prison is in 
compliance with 95% or more of the nonmandatory standards, 
it can designate up to 2% of the noncompliant, nonmandatory 
standards as “discretionary.”14  If the compliance score for 
nonmandatory standards is below 95%, the prison can 
denominate 1% of the nonmandatory standards with which it is 
noncompliant as “discretionary.”15
B. Some Observed Benefits and a Systemic Weakness of 
Correctional Accreditation
Like any human endeavor, the correctional accreditation 
process is imperfect.  Yet having served for thirteen years as a 
member of the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, 
eleven of those years as the American Bar Association’s 
representative on the Commission, I have witnessed the 
dramatic potential that the accreditation process has to 
catalyze improvements in conditions of confinement, abate 
practices that transgress constitutional requirements or 
professional norms, and transform the culture of a correctional 
12. Id. at 26-27. 
13. Id. at 27. 
14. Id.
15. Id.
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institution from one marked by the debasement of staff and 
inmates to one suffused with a commitment to professionalism.  
I have observed the expenditure of millions of dollars to 
eradicate physical-plant problems in correctional facilities, the 
closing of unsafe and dilapidated housing units in correctional 
institutions, the adoption and refinement of programs to train 
thousands of correctional staff, and the overhaul of policies, 
procedures, and practices as correctional facilities have striven 
to meet the requirements for accreditation.  I can attest that 
because of correctional accreditation, many correctional 
facilities in this country are far safer, more humane, and better 
operated than they were before undergoing what can be the 
rigors of accreditation. 
As a Commissioner, I also have seen firsthand the 
weaknesses in the correctional accreditation process and have 
labored, as have other Commissioners, ACA staff, accreditation 
auditors, and others both from within and outside the 
corrections field, to correct perceived deficiencies in the ACA 
accreditation process.  This reform process has been, and will 
be, never-ending, because whether dealing with the operation 
of an accreditation process, a correctional facility, an 
educational institution, a business, or some other human 
enterprise, we always can “do things better.”
The purpose of this section of the article is not to identify 
the myriad steps that the Commission on Accreditation for 
Corrections already has taken to improve the accreditation 
process.  Nor is it to prescribe the many additional steps that 
can be taken to further refine accreditation as a tool of 
correctional oversight.  Rather, the purpose of this portion of 
the article is to highlight one systemic feature of accreditation 
that detracts substantially from, and potentially could 
eviscerate, its efficacy as an oversight mechanism.  That 
feature is the voluntary nature of accreditation—the fact that, 
with few exceptions, participation in the accreditation process 
is optional.16
The accreditation process is fee-based; in other words, 
16. Some states do require that a private prison or jail be ACA-
accredited in order to house inmates or certain inmates in that state.  See, 
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-105.1(3)(a) (2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-
805(2)(m) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 47-803(2)(a) (1995); N.M. STAT. § 33-15-
3(A)(3) (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 563.3(C) (2009). 
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correctional facilities or programs that want to go through the 
ACA accreditation process must pay a large sum of money to 
the American Correctional Association.17  The voluntary nature 
of accreditation, combined with the fact that it is fee-based, 
makes the accreditation process vulnerable, both financially 
and operationally.  Large prison systems involved in the 
accreditation process can and do wield enormous power over 
that process, since they can withdraw their institutions from 
the process if it is not changed in ways that they see fit.  And if 
those withdrawals were to occur, the Commission and the ACA 
would be sapped of the funds needed to maintain, expand, and 
improve the accreditation process. 
One of the chief negative repercussions of a voluntary 
system of accreditation then is that it spawns unrelenting, and 
sometimes irresistible, pressures to water down accreditation 
standards and make accreditation procedures more lax.  To 
their credit, the Commission on Accreditation for Corrections 
and the ACA Standards Committee, the entity which adopts, 
modifies, and repeals accreditation standards, often have 
resisted these pressures.  Other times, though, both the 
Commission and the Standards Committee have succumbed to 
demands to make it easier for prisons to be accredited, 
changing the accreditation process in ways that, at least in my 
opinion, are not in keeping with the avowed purposes of 
accreditation and, in the long run, could lead to its 
denouement. 
Perhaps the best example of the fragility of the 
accreditation process due to its voluntary nature is the 
Commission’s adoption of the “opt-out provision,” the policy 
that allows correctional facilities, up to a certain limit, to pick 
and choose the nonmandatory standards with which they will 
comply.  For years, a state department of corrections with a 
large number of prisons involved in the accreditation process 
tendered formal and informal proposals to the Commission to 
17. Effective January 1, 2009, the accreditation fee became standardized 
for all correctional facilities, regardless of their size or type.  Facilities must 
pay $3,000 for each day of an accreditation audit plus $1,500 for each auditor 
on the audit team.  Facilities are eligible for a discounted fee based on the 
number of other facilities within the agency that are participating in 
accreditation.  Letter from James A. Gondles, Jr., Executive Dir., Am. Corr. 
Ass’n, to “To Whom It May Concern” (Nov. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.aca.org/standards/pdfs/AccreditationFeeLetter.pdf. 
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adopt such an opt-out option, but the Commission always 
rebuffed these proposals.  But when several other large prison 
systems involved in the accreditation process joined in this 
lobbying effort, the Commission capitulated. 
I do not mean to imply that the individuals whose efforts 
culminated in the approval of the opt-out provision acted with 
sinister motives.  Far from it.  The provision was drafted and 
approved by individuals who, for years, have evinced a deep 
commitment to accreditation and to improving conditions and 
operations in correctional facilities.  The opt-out provision 
primarily was the byproduct of the frustration felt by prison 
officials who needed assistance from a third party, typically 
funding from the legislature, in order to meet certain 
accreditation standards, but who found that such assistance 
was never forthcoming.  But however understandable those 
frustrations, the fact remains that the prospect of a feared 
mass exodus of institutions from the accreditation process, if 
the Commission failed to approve the opt-out proposal, 
overhung the Commission’s deliberations of the proposal to 
which it ultimately acquiesced. 
The question then is whether the correctional accreditation 
process can be restructured in a way that would capitalize on 
its strengths while avoiding the pitfalls that attend a wholly 
voluntary process.  Other accreditation processes, those outside 
the field of corrections, can provide guidance in answering that 
question.  Set forth below is an overview of the structural 
framework of one of those other processes—that which pertains 
to the accreditation of colleges, universities, law schools, and 
other institutions of higher learning. 
II.  Accreditation of Higher-Education Institutions 
The structure for accrediting higher-education institutions 
differs from the structure for accrediting correctional 
institutions in a number of ways, three of which warrant 
mentioning here.  First, a federal statute requires that colleges, 
universities, and other institutions of higher education be 
accredited as a condition of receiving certain federal funds, 
including federal student loans.18  This statutory provision, as 
18. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(j) (2006). 
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a practical matter, makes accreditation mandatory, because 
educational institutions cannot attract students if prospective 
students cannot obtain loans to fund their education. 
Second, the Department of Education (DOE) must officially 
recognize an entity as an accrediting agency in order for it to 
have the authority to accredit an institution of higher learning, 
making the institution eligible to receive federal funding.19
The American Bar Association, for example, is an entity that 
accredits law schools.  But the ABA’s accreditation of a law 
school will make the school eligible for certain federal funds 
only if the Department of Education recognizes the ABA as an 
accrediting agency (which it does). 
Third, in order to be recognized by the Department of 
Education as an accrediting agency, the agency must meet a 
number of requirements set forth in a federal statute and in 
regulations promulgated by the DOE to implement that 
statute.20  In short, an entity that wants to accredit higher-
education institutions must itself go through what is in form, 
though not in name, an accreditation process—one which 
entails a “comprehensive review and evaluation of the 
performance” of the accrediting agency.21  The accrediting 
agency, for example, must adopt accreditation standards that 
meet certain stated requirements,22 must enforce those 
standards in a consistent manner,23 and must adopt and follow 
certain prescribed procedures when accrediting educational 
institutions.24  Ensuring that accreditation auditors are well-
trained and disclosing to the public when an institution is 
undergoing accreditation or reaccreditation review are 
examples of the operating procedures that an agency must 
institute in order to be recognized by the Department of 
Education as an accrediting body.25
19. Id. § 1099b(m). 
20. Id. § 1099b(a)-(c); 34 C.F.R. §§ 602.10-.28 (2009). 
21. 20 U.S.C. § 1099b(n)(1). 
22. Id. § 1099b(a)(5).  The accreditation standards, for example, must 
assess the educational institution’s facilities, whether adequate funds have 
been allocated for the institution’s operations, and student support services. 
Id. § 1099b(a)(5)(D)-(F). 
23. Id. § 1099b(a)(4)(A). 
24. Id. § 1099b(c). 
25. Id. § 1099b(c)(1), (8). 
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III.  A New Framework for Correctional Accreditation 
I believe that the general framework for the accreditation 
of institutions of higher education—where accrediting bodies 
themselves, in effect, have to be accredited—should be 
imported into the realm of correctional accreditation.  Under 
this new framework, correctional institutions in which 
individuals are confined, including prisons, jails, juvenile 
detention centers, and juvenile training schools, would have to 
be accredited in order to be eligible to receive federal funds.  
Since correctional facilities receive federal money for an array 
of purposes, including to fund construction and institutional 
programs, making the receipt of federal funds contingent on 
accreditation likely would propel many more correctional 
institutions to become accredited than currently are.  And this, 
in my opinion, would be a good thing, since accreditation holds 
promise, though not fully realized at this point, of ensuring 
that correctional institutions across the country meet 
standards that reflect legal requirements, sound professional 
practices, and human-rights principles. 
Under the envisioned framework, the entity or entities 
that accredit correctional facilities would have to be certified in 
order to have the accrediting authority that would make a 
facility eligible to receive federal funds.  The Department of 
Justice might be the logical locus from which this certification 
function would be carried out, but the pros and cons of vesting 
the certification authority in the Department of Justice or some 
other entity would need to be explored fully.  Whoever exercises 
this certification power, the certification process, if structured 
properly, would make the correctional accreditation process 
much more open and accountable.  Just as correctional 
accrediting bodies scrutinize correctional institutions or parts 
of those institutions to determine if they meet certain 
standards, the operations of those accrediting bodies would be 
scrutinized to ensure that they comport with certain 
fundamental principles of effective institutional oversight.  
Examples of such fundamental principles would be the 
implementation of safeguards to avoid conflicts of interest 
when rendering accreditation decisions and the adoption of 
measures to ensure consistency in the enforcement of 
accreditation standards. 
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The certification of correctional accreditation bodies, if the 
certification process were contoured appropriately, also would 
make the operations of prisons and other correctional 
institutions more open and accountable.  For example, the 
statutory or regulatory criteria that have to be met in order for 
an agency to be certified as a correctional accrediting body 
could include a requirement that the agency conduct site 
inspections of prisons and other correctional facilities at 
unannounced times, at least in certain circumstances.  The 
governing statute and regulations also could mandate that 
accreditation agencies, such as the Commission on 
Accreditation for Corrections, disseminate audit reports and 
accreditation decisions to the public.  That way, if an 
accrediting agency accredited an institution that clearly does 
not meet accreditation standards or whose conditions threaten 
the health or safety of staff or inmates at the institution, the 
error in the accreditation decision more likely would be brought 
to the attention of the accrediting agency.  The accrediting 
agency then could rectify the error and, perhaps even more 
importantly, determine what changes need to be made in its 
accreditation standards or processes to avert such errors in the 
future.  And if the accrediting agency failed to take adequate 
corrective measures and was in violation of the requirements 
for certification as an accrediting agency, its deficiencies or 
derelictions could trigger the revocation or nonrenewal of its 
certification as an accrediting agency.26
Several other benefits would accrue from the accreditation 
framework outlined above.  The requirement that correctional 
institutions be accredited as a condition of receiving federal 
funding, combined with the requirement that the accrediting 
body meet the standards for certification, would dissipate, at 
least somewhat, the inexorable pressures that correctional 
institutions often exert on an accrediting agency to dilute its 
accreditation requirements.  Correctional institutions would be 
less likely to abandon or refrain from undergoing accreditation 
review, or threaten to do so, if the consequence of that decision 
was a loss of federal funding. 
26. By way of analogy, the DOE can vest an agency or association with 
accrediting authority for up to five years, but the DOE can limit, suspend, or 
terminate that authority because of noncompliance with the requirements for 
DOE recognition as an accrediting body.  Id. § 1099b(d). 
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It is true that if, as in the field of higher education,27 there 
were multiple entities certified as accrediting bodies, some 
correctional institutions might troll around for the 
accreditation process with the lowest accreditation standards 
or threaten to do so if an accrediting agency failed to repeal 
certain accreditation requirements.  But the statutory and 
regulatory specifications that an accrediting agency would have 
to meet in order to be certified could be drafted in a way that 
guards against efforts to circumvent the purposes of 
accreditation and that promotes healthy, not unhealthy, 
competition between accrediting bodies. 
Requiring that a correctional facility be accredited by a 
certified accrediting agency in order to be eligible to receive 
federal funds also would provide legislatures (and local 
governing bodies) with an added incentive to appropriate the 
money needed for correctional facilities to meet accreditation 
standards.  As many of the speakers at this conference 
observed, legislatures repeatedly have failed to allocate the 
funds or implement other reforms that would enable 
correctional professionals to rectify grave problems in the 
conditions in, and operations of, correctional facilities.  Linking 
federal funding to accreditation would be one way to begin 
addressing this endemic failure. 
Conclusion 
Extending the certification-accreditation framework that 
governs the accreditation of institutions of higher education 
into the field of corrections would be an important and critical 
first step in bringing transparency and accountability into the 
“closed world” of corrections and in ensuring that correctional 
institutions adhere to legal requirements, professional 
standards, and a transcendent obligation to respect basic 
human rights.  But it would only be a first step.  Those of us 
who are involved in, and committed to, the accreditation 
process and the realization of its potential would need to 
continue to examine how that process can be augmented and 
27. Links to lists of the many entities that accredit postsecondary 
institutions or programs can be found at 
http://www.ed.gov/admins/finaid/accred/accreditation_pg7.html#RegionalInst
itutional. 
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improved within this new framework.  And other correctional 
oversight mechanisms would need to be developed or refined in 
jurisdictions across the country if the objectives of correctional 
oversight are to be met fully. 
Large-scale change takes time.  Effecting such change 
requires perseverance and a level of patience that can be 
elusive when observing patent problems that can and should be 
resolved more quickly than they ever are.  Now is the time for 
this kind of large-scale change in the ways in which conditions 
and operations in this nation’s correctional facilities are 
monitored.  So let’s roll up our sleeves, get to work . . . and 
persevere. 
